

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re notes on Shultz debrief of U.S. Senators on the Summit (w/notations), 1p <i>R 11/9/06 F04-075 #1</i>	12/18/87	B1
2. talking points	for President's meeting with Gorbachev: December 9 Regional Issues, 3p <i>R 11/9/06 F04-075 #2</i>	n.d.	B1
3. talking points	re defense and space (w/notes on back of last page), 8p total <i>R 11/9/06 F04-075 #3</i>	n.d.	B1
4. letter	Max Kampelman to H. Baker, 1p	12/7/87	B6
5. memo	Stephen Harrison to Baker, re media request for working space on the Treasury Department grounds, 2p	12/4/87	B2 B7e

RESTRICTIONS

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HB
1/22/88

All parties to a treaty must have a common understanding of what every part of that treaty means.

Whatever ambiguity exists in the Summit Joint Statement must be removed before a treaty is signed.

That's what the JCS said in their memo. We all agree and our negotiators will be doing that in Geneva.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15/1

Senator Baker,
From GPS.

→

Talking Points on Gorbachev's Book Perestroyka

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 S/S

I. General

- Designed for Western audience.
- Logical presentation of themes familiar to Soviet citizens from Gorbachev's speeches.
- Compared with routine Soviet political literature, a surprisingly frank treatment of what has been wrong with Soviet society.
- The cure for economic and other problems is presented undogmatically, suitably dressed up in Lenin quotes.
- Book was completed in August/September 1987, before the Yeltsin affair or the Summit. Shows political boldness but is realistic in counseling against extremes of glasnost.
- Gorbachev concedes that perestroyka has been more difficult than he first imagined.

II. Glasnost and Perestroyka

- Gorbachev makes a strong case for economic and social change. Glasnost is a conscious tool to effect change.
- Glasnost will help close the gap between rhetoric and reality.
- Glasnost implies criticism, but this criticism must be responsible, not simply ambitious (Yeltsin's problem!).
- Many officials still resist criticism. Some of them try to intimidate critics by warning that the West will take advantage (this was precisely the argument of KGB chief Chebrikov in September 1987 speech!).
- The press plays a key role; it must be more effective, less boring.
- Not everyone accepts perestroyka, but Gorbachev cites support from the masses in letters he receives. Perestroyka is a revolution both from above and below.

III. Economic Reform

- Gorbachev stresses socialist principles, e.g., public ownership. He shuns capitalist labels or institutions.
- Nevertheless, a few "exceptions" are allowed: private retail and service activities; family farms on contract.
- Concept: Enhance individual interest (incentive) by differentiated pay.
- Concept: Start with the enterprise, not the center. Decentralize decision-making.
- Concept: Replace administrative methods with economic devices.
- Eliminate subsidies by reforming prices. (But Gorbachev doesn't address the question of allowing market forces to set prices.)
- Planning becomes strategic, rather than detailed management from afar. Layers of planning and administrative bureaucracy are to be cut.

- Investment must go into high technology rather than adding grandiose new projects. And Soviets must learn how to harness technology better.
- The consumer expects and deserves better food, health care and housing.
- He fails to address the key question of military spending (except for general language about the needs of the Third World).

IV. Political and Social Issues

- No change in the Party's monopoly on power.
- But multiple candidates should compete for office (at least on the local level).
- The rule of law must be strengthened, and past injustices compensated. Very harsh criticism of Stalin's abuses.
- Gorbachev's view of women is patronizing and traditional. He wants to lighten their housekeeping burden.
- Soviet Jews are not mentioned, except in brief reference to the twin evils of Zionism and anti-Semitism. Other nationality problems are discussed from an unabashed Russian chauvinistic viewpoint.
- The KGB is mentioned only in dealing with Western critics. Gorbachev's answer is that the Party controls it.
- Religion is scarcely mentioned, except in a letter from a domestic supporter of perestroyka.

V. Foreign Policy

- By far the weakest section of the book. Self-serving descriptions of Geneva and Reykjavik.
- Gorbachev's world view shows awareness of concepts that may be novel in USSR, but are a decade old in the West.
- For example, he stresses interdependence, global issues such as pollution, and a multipolar rather than bipolar world.
- There's a strong pitch for the UN, and an emphasis on a more flexible diplomatic style.
- On nuclear issues, Gorbachev places human survival above class struggle, an important revision of Marxist dogma.
- He has a distorted view of the "military-industrial complex." He implies that in the US, the professional military are sensible but the industrialists are warmongers.
- Chernobyl was a lesson. Nuclear war would be far worse: no winners.

KEY PASSAGES OF PERESTROYKA

	<u>page</u>
Why Perestroyka? Problems of Soviet society	17-25
Perestroyka as a Revolution. Lenin makes peace at Brest-Litovsk--a short-term necessity	49-55
Politics is the art of the Possible	65-74
Glasnost (openness)	75-80
Economic Reform	84-88
Promoting Technology. Why detente was a disappointment.	92-95
Rule of Law, individual rights	105-110
Women--a traditional view	116-117
Perceptions of Western hostility	124-132
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Khrushchev's "We will bury you" and other Western distortions	150-151
Relations with China	169
Afghanistan	176-177
US-Soviet Relations	210-212
Ideology and Foreign Policy	221
Reykjavik Summit	236-241

403
12/18/87

SUBJECT: Notes on Shultz Debrief of U.S. Senators on the Summit

Alison Fortier asked that the following msg be passed to you: There was heavy attendance Shultz spent most of the time discussing arms control. This is not word for word; but I thought it would be useful for you to have the gist of what he said for the 8:30 bipartisan leadership meeting tomorrow:

We have a good shot at a START agreement and a framework on defense and space that may be acceptable but we are still a long way from agreement. He then went through the sub-limits and the SLCM issue stating that we agreed to address the SLCM issue. He read the ABM language in the final statement and stated that when DoD makes its budget proposals next year we will propose what is "required." We told them don't try anything that pulls the plug on SDI; the President will not agree to it and START will never get ratified. Then he said: "We decided not to say anything in the final statement about particular regions, people there wouldn't like that. We agreed to keep discussions going." He then went into a long description on the discussions on Afghanistan. Shultz stated that it remains to be seen whether the ball has been moved along. They have linked troop withdrawal to national reconciliation. We told them that this is a process -- not an event. I wouldn't say that we achieved something on Afghanistan, but by the end of next year we may have a different situation there. Shultz said there were other bilateral issues discussed -- he did not go into them and he said nothing on Central America. There was little time for questions from the Senators. The only one of note was a question from Senator Moynihan who complained about there being only one statement on human rights in the final statement.

*Life + state of Union
by Robert Payne*

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F04-075#1
BY LEJ, NARA, DATE 11/9/06

Ouf, 12/4/87

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CCB NARA, Date 9/3/04

~~Confidential~~

Geneva

The Soviet-U.S. meetings included six "one-on-ones" between the President and General Secretary (interpreters only, sometimes no notetakers) and two shorter (under ten minutes) "one-on-ones." There were four plenary sessions at which Shultz, Regan, McFarlane, Ambassador Hartman, Ridgway, Matlock and Palmer were present.

Iceland

The six Soviet-U.S. meetings were much more restricted; only the two heads of state, their foreign ministers (and two notetakers and two interpreters) in attendance. There were two U.S. only meetings that included Shultz, Regan, Poindexter, Kampelman (at one), Nitze, Perle, Linhard, Adelman and Speakes (at the other).



United States Department of State

Office of the Secretary

Friday, December 18, 1987

The Honorable
Howard Baker
Chief of Staff

This is the toast mentioned by
Secretary Shultz in which you
expressed interest.

Attached also is a copy for
The President as he expressed
interest.


Marcia K. Wong
Special Assistant

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TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV
DECEMBER 9 -- REGIONAL ISSUES

- Now let me turn to regional issues.
- Regional issues will greatly influence the long-term character of our relations and their immediate future as well.
- Afghanistan is at the top of the list. There are more Soviet troops in that country today than when I entered office.
- Our governments have had extensive discussions about Afghanistan; we understand each other's points of view. I welcome your declarations of intent to withdraw. It is long since time to act fully on these declarations. This would signal the beginning of a new era in East-West relations and in international affairs generally.
- The nature of the conflict means that a settlement depends mostly on you. We shall do our part to help if you actually withdraw. We and other governments can help assure that Afghanistan is not a threat to your security after you withdraw. We are perfectly prepared to do our part in the emergence of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. It is time, now, here, at this summit, to set dates certain for the starting and ending of your withdrawal of troops -- so that all troops are out by the end of 1988.

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NLS F04-075 #2

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/9/06

LUNCHEON TOAST BY US SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
TO
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR

DECEMBER 9, 1987

Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gorbachev, Distinguished Guests.

Benjamin Franklin, the father of American diplomacy, who exchanged correspondence with Catherine the Great -- and for whom this room is named -- would be fascinated to be with us today. For this is the first time the leader of the Soviet Union has visited the Department of State. Welcome.

Your visit here, Mr. General Secretary, and the prospect of a visit by President Reagan to Moscow, should cause us to think about guidelines for managing our relations. What should we both be keeping in mind?

First, ours is a relationship as important as it is unique. It is important because we each bear an immense burden of leadership in the world; it is unique because the nuclear era demands that we engage each other despite our profound differences. As you said in your book Mr. General Secretary, "There is no getting away from each other."

Second, our relationship will continue to be a difficult one to manage. We have contrasting philosophies, political systems and national interests. Our basic values, systems and interests will persist, even as the necessity to work together increases.

Third, we must be realistic, avoiding extremes either of hostility or euphoria through the ups and downs of our relations. The best approach to dealing with one another is one Ben Franklin might have suggested: Be down-to-earth, pragmatic and businesslike in seeking to solve concrete problems.

Fourth, we must speak with clarity and candor to one another about our differences. That is why at this summit we have stressed the fundamental importance we attach to human rights, as set forth in the universal declaration and the Helsinki Final Act. As the European Community heads of government stated December 5, "Respect for human rights and freedom is a prerequisite for confidence, understanding and cooperation." We have spoken with candor about regional issues as well. You have not hesitated to speak your mind to us. And we have made some progress. As President Reagan has said, we owe each other the tribute of candor, and candor will help get results.

Fifth, we must look to the future without neglecting the lessons of the past. Too often we face the past and back into the future. In five to ten years, our world will be vastly different from the one we know today -- and from the post-war world of the past forty years which has conditioned so much of our thinking. Franklin -- and Lomonosov, his contemporary -- were ready, and eager, for the future. So should we be. The material substances of daily life are being transformed. The speed of human transactions is accelerating. Scientific, economic, and political matters are now global in dimension. And through all these changes runs the thread of knowledge: its discovery, its rapid transmission as information, and the education needed to use it.

This leads to a sixth point -- the recognition that openness to ideas, information and contacts is the key to future success. The conceptual breakthroughs embodied in the INF treaty's provisions for verification and on-site inspection are but one example of the powerful pull which openness is already exerting in a key area of our relations.

We must seek steady progress toward a more open, more predictable, more stable and constructive relationship. In this time of change, a complicated interplay of international relationships complicates the management of our bilateral affairs. But new patterns of interaction also offer new opportunities for cooperation and progress. Let us grasp those opportunities.

Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gorbachev, to your health, to the health of the President and Mrs. Reagan, and to the Soviet and American peoples!

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overnight numbers:

- the most important issue is now war/peace
- high approval rating on how the president is doing his job
- sharpest job rating increase wirthlin has ever measured
- highest job rating since Iran
- 6-8 point jump in handling foreign affairs
- NOTE: only less than half of respondents knew about INF, so there is room for good growth over the next few nights as it is better known
- with that in mind, approval for INF treaty over 7 out of 10
- most important step since WW II in slowing down arms race

***added note: we do not get good marks for handling cuban jail problem

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CONTINGENCY POINT

If Gorbachev says: "I'll set a date for completing withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan on the same day you publicly declare that you will halt military support to the guerrillas. We can do that today if you wish."

- You know very well that we have already committed ourselves in the Geneva negotiations to stop such support after you have begun a speedy withdrawal according to an agreed timetable.
- I am not going to pull the plug on freedom fighters who count on our support before you have even pulled out a single soldier. I'm not even going to talk about doing so.
- The ball is in your court. Set a date and a short timetable now and everything else will follow.

-
- The Iran-Iraq war must also be addressed. We must return to the pattern of cooperation when we voted together for UNSC Resolution 598. I am worried that your subsequent policies are a departure from that cooperation, that they encourage Iranian intransigence and belligerence. We have a situation in which Iran could be by a sense of Soviet support to take

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violent action against the United States. This could set back our relations profoundly.

-- I want to mention Berlin because it could be the site of very positive developments. I believe you could and should tear down the Wall today. But in any case, we should take smaller, practical steps to ameliorate the division of the city and to symbolize our desire to overcome the division of Europe in a humane and stabilizing way. My government is working with the British and French on such proposals, and will soon present them to you. I hope you will respond favorably.

-- Yesterday, Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz said that "Iraq accepts Resolution 5980 in all its parts." Iran is still undercutting the process. Now is the time for you and me to lend our weight to the process. Let us announce today that we are moving forward together on a second resolution.

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TALKING POINTS: DEFENSE AND SPACE

A. Review START Discussion

- Yesterday was a proud day. But as you said, we must keep working.
- I want to return to some of the subjects we talked about in our first meeting, especially the relationship between strategic offense and defense.
- Our experts met yesterday on START and had a good discussion. On our side, we have stressed two important issues: verification and counting rules.
- On verification, our ideas build on what we learned from the INF negotiation.
- Counting rules are also important. We can't decide issues like sublimits until we know exactly how different types of weapons will be counted. However we are encouraged by your willingness to compromise between 4800 and 5100 ballistic missile warheads. If we can come to an agreement on this, I will be forthcoming on an ICBM sublimit.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F04-075 #3

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 11/9/06

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- Your side has discussed sea-launched cruise missiles and suggested new ideas for their verification. You have also discussed a readiness to examine verification of mobile missiles. We appreciate your thoughts, and while we have some doubts, we are certainly willing to study your concepts.

B. Present U.S. Defense and Space Position

- Today the working group has moved to Defense and Space issues. While we understand each other's position in START, this isn't true in Defense and Space. I want to urge that we to move together in a direction that we are both already going separately.
- If we can agree on a treaty reducing strategic arsenals by 50 percent and preserve the opportunity for effective strategic defenses, we would stand on the threshold of a new and stronger regime of strategic stability.
- Offensive nuclear weapons have helped to keep the peace for over four decades. But we must look to the future.
- You and I hold awesome responsibilities. Our only means to avoid nuclear war is to be prepared to strike each other's homeland with devastating consequences not only for our countries, but for the world.

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-3-

- Our successors and more importantly our people deserve better.
- I want to strengthen peace by finding new ways to save lives rather than new ways to avenge them.
- Providing a better, more stable basis for peace is the central purpose of SDI.
- Effective defenses against ballistic missiles can strengthen stability in a number of ways:
- First, they would significantly increase uncertainty about whether missiles could penetrate defenses to destroy the other side's capability to retaliate. This would become even more important after a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms.
- Second, defenses would give us an alternative to accepting massive devastation if a missile is ever launched in error or against either of us by another country.
- Third, defenses can reenforce arms reductions. Fifty percent reductions, combined with increasingly effective defenses, could offer a real hope of protecting people, not just weapons.
- Finally, defenses would underwrite the integrity of arms reductions by reducing advantages of cheating.

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-4-

- In short, the combination of effective defenses and a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals would establish a whole new concept of strategic stability.
- It would be stable by the measure we in this country hold most important -- removing any incentive to strike first in a crisis.
- But it would also improve stability by the measure your military holds most important, ensuring that neither side is surprised by the military advances of the other.
- Thus we could improve strategic stability by both U.S. and Soviet standards.
- I noticed that in remarks reported in the March 1, 1987 edition of Pravda you focused on the issue of deployment. I think that's the right approach. Therefore, I am prepared to negotiate with you a period during which neither side would deploy strategic defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty.
- The length of the period can be agreed once we've got the terms settled. You've referred to Reykjavik and talked about 10 years. I believe we will be able to agree on the length of the period once the terms are settled.

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-5-

- In order to make sure you are not surprised by events during the non-deployment period, I am also ready to commit to a package designed to increase predictability for both sides. I'll ask Secretary Carlucci to describe that package in a moment.
- In short, I am offering you predictability during a non-deployment period of certain length. In return, I need to protect our existing right -- and your right -- to conduct necessary "research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack," as your Marshal Grechko said in 1972. And we both need a clear right to deploy defenses after the period.
- Thus, the U.S. seeks a separate, new treaty of unlimited duration that could go into effect the same time the START Treaty goes into effect.
- This Treaty would contain a period during which both sides commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
- After that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy such defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty, after giving 6 months notice of intent to deploy.

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-6-

- During the non-deployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required. Our negotiators in Geneva will explain what we mean by deployment.
- As you can see, I am trying to create a future in which we will each have reduced strategic offensive arms by 50 percent and we can both pursue our strategic defense programs as common elements in a new regime which in your words you have called "strategic stability."
- In this context, I took special note of your interview with Tom Brokaw, in which you acknowledged a Soviet program comparable to SDI. This is a step in the right direction.
- Here is a summary of our position. I'll ask Secretary Shultz to explain it in some detail.

[HAND OVER DOCUMENT]

[After Secretary Shultz's comments]

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- Secretary Carlucci, would you explain our ideas on predictability.

[After Secretary Carlucci's comments]

- I am sure you have some points to make on this issue.

[After Gorbachev's comments]

- We've made our positions clear to one another. I suggest we turn the issue over to the working group for further discussion.

The boys have done
a good job preparing
for


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 8, 1987

AB
12/9

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR HOWARD BAKER
KENNETH DUBOFFSTEIN
COLIN POWELL
TOM CRISCOM
RHETT DAWSON

FROM: William L. Ball, III 

Attached is Senator Dole's statement issued on formation of a
Republican Task Force on INF. The Task Force had its first meeting
today in Dole's office.

cc: Max Kampelman
Ed Fox
Margo Carlisle
Alison Fortier
Bob Linhard
Fam Turner

News from Senator

BOB DOLE



(R - Kansas)

SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
DECEMBER 8, 1987CONTACT: WALT RIKER, DALE TATE
(202) 224-3135

DOLE ANNOUNCES REPUBLICAN INF TREATY TASK FORCE

Today I am announcing formation of a Republican Task Force to coordinate expeditious consideration of the INF Treaty. I have asked Assistant Republican Leader Al Simpson to chair the group, which includes: Senators Helms, Lugar and Pressler of the Foreign Relations Committee; Warner, Quayle, and Wilson of Armed Services; Cohen and Specter of Intelligence; and Stevens and Wallop from the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. I will be an ex-officio member of the group.

We would not be where we are -- on the verge of Senate consideration of an important nuclear arms reduction agreement -- without Ronald Reagan's leadership. Every Senate Republican knows that; and we are united in our desire to work cooperatively with the President. The Task Force will be doing just that.

And the President has indicated his desire, as well, that we work closely, constructively together. He has offered to send key advisers like Secretary Shultz and National Security Advisor Powell up to the Hill to work with both Republicans and Democrats. Certainly on the Republican side, we intend to take advantage of that offer.

We have some real, legitimate concerns. And I know from my own talks with the President, Howard Baker, George Shultz and others, that they have a persuasive case to make -- on Alliance matters, and the other issues related to INF. So it will benefit all of us to have exchanges on these points.

The bottom line for most Republicans is that we want to support the President; we will do our Constitutional duty; and we see no reason why the roles must conflict. And I think the President sees it that way, too.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

① Jolt
⑦ HHS

The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
Room 45 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

URGENT AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attention: Ms. Susan Slye

DETERMINED TO BE AN
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By NARA CCB Date 8/3/04

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